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Abstract: Equality is equity. In other words, equality can be associated with being equal in 
status, rights or opportunities. Article 8 (1) and (2) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution 
address the concept of equality in Malaysia. However, the equality provision in Article 8(1) is 
not absolute. This can be seen, for example, under Article 136 of the Federal Constitution 
which requires all federal employees shall be treated impartially regardless of their races. 
However, it is important to note that Article 153 of the Federal Constitution did provide 
special privileges, quotas and reservations for Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, 
and this provision has been challenged legally and politically. The late Tun Suffian managed 
to reduce the gap between Articles 136 and 153 by introducing the concept of ‘affirmative 
action’ whereby the reservations and quotas are permissible under the Federal Constitution. 
The objective of this paper is to identify the issues in implementing affirmative action in 
Malaysia. Doctrinal legal research methodology has been used to achieve the objective. It 
was found that there are many issues have been posed on the implementation of affirmative 
action and the sustainability of the concept is another challenge yet to be determined. 
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Introduction   
The concept of equality is well recognized and becomes the most fundamental idea that 
appears in all conventions on human rights. This concept has been largely acknowledged in 
most constitution of the democratic countries. The principle of equality is the most 
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fundamental human rights and has been described as "the starting point of all liberties" 
(Baderin, 2003).  In Malaysia, this idea is acknowledged through Article 8 of the Federal 
Constitution that forbids discrimination on five grounds namely religion, race, descent, place 
of birth or gender. This concept nevertheless has been established as not absolute but 
qualified; qualified in the sense that the existing legal framework, particularly Article 153 of 
the Federal Constitution, allows preferential treatment and special privileges that commonly 
known as “affirmative action”. Affirmative action has its own arguments and poses certain 
social and political issues such as racial discrimination that claimed to be resulted from a 
scheme of preferential treatment for Malays. The aim of this conceptual paper is to identify 
the issues in implementing the concept of affirmative action in Malaysia.   
 
Problem Statement 
Affirmative action is a term used in the United States while in the United Kingdom it is called 
‘positive discrimination’ or ‘equal opportunity’ (Collin, 1988).  Affirmative action is 
explained as ‘policy of avoiding discrimination against groups in society who have a 
disadvantage (such as handicapped people etc.)’ while positive discrimination has been 
explained as ‘giving more favourable treatment to a minority to help them to be more equal’ 
(Collin, 1988).  Affirmative action is essentially a “race or gender solution” to a “race or 
gender problem”. Hence, affirmative action is a public policy which has been designed to 
compensate the victims who have been treated unjustly. It’s been used to encourage 
favourable treatment of socially disadvantaged groups. Practically, affirmative action means a 
program to compensate disadvantaged groups who have been discriminate for a long period 
of time. For example, those who historically suffered because been excluded or given limited 
access to societal rewards; they could now be given an opportunity to catch up through the 
concept of affirmative action. However, it is equally important to note that affirmative actions 
are often seen as the antithesis of equality. Article 8(1) has been decided by the Federal Court 
in the case of Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155) as not 
absolute. It is qualified, specifically when discrimination is permitted in Article 8(5). Article 
8(5), however, does not explicitly spell out the concept of affirmative action.   
 
Research Methodology 
This study applies doctrinal legal research or library-based study which means that the 
materials will be gathered from libraries, archives and other databases. The basic aim is to 
discover, explain, examine, analyse and present, in a systematic form, facts, principles, 
provisions, concepts, theories or the working of certain laws or legal institutions (Anwarul 
Yaqin, 2007). Therefore, the theory of equality itself is examined. Moreover, the background 
and context of Malaysia itself will be looked into particularly in terms of its history, social 
and political matters in order to find and determine the concept of equality as it is applied in 
Malaysia. In determining this, the legal framework that govern the operation of affirmative 
action in Malaysia will be scrutinized which all these require for analytical method of 
analysis.   
 
Findings 
The principle of equality is one of the fundamental human rights that is recognized and 
embedded in most constitution of the democratic countries. For Malaysia, the concept of 
equality contains in Article 8 of the Federal Constitution. Article 8(1) declares that “all 
persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.” In order to 
strengthen this idea of equality before the law, Article 8(2) forbids discrimination on five 
enumerated grounds namely religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender. Black’s Law 






Dictionary (2014) defines equality as the condition of possessing the same rights, privileges, 
and immunities, and being liable to the same duties. Equality is equity. In other words, 
equality is the state of being equal, especially in status, rights, or opportunities. For example, 
‘equality before the law’ is a basic human right in the most of the constitutions of democratic 
countries, and its content appears in all conventions on human rights.  
 
Article 153 of the Federal Constitution provides a scheme of preferential treatment for Malays 
and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak in a number of specified areas. A ‘Malay’ is defined 
under Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution as a person who professes the religion of 
Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and: (a) was before 
Merdeka Day born in the Federation or in Singapore or born of parents one of whom was in 
the Federation or in Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the Federation or Singapore; or 
(b) is the issue of such person. A native of Sabah is defined under Article 161A (6) (b) as a 
citizen who is the child or grandchild of a person of an indigenous race and was born in Sabah 
or to a father domiciled in Sabah. On the other hand, a native of Sarawak is defined under 
Article 161A (6)(a) & (7) as a citizen who belongs to a race specified as indigenous or is of 
mixed the meaning of the phrase ‘natives of Sabah and Sarawak’ in the context of this study. 
The provision on special privileges, quotas and reservations for Malays and the natives of 
Sabah and Sarawak have been challenged legally and politically. These permissible 
reservations and quotas are acknowledged by the term of “affirmative action” with its 
provisions that formed as legal framework under the Federal Constitution. 
 
Harding (1996) argued that the concept of equality has been limited in its application in 
Malaysia. According to Harding, not only have the constitutional provisions introduced 
express limitations on the principle, but the courts have interpreted the right to equality in a 
very limited way. In a related work, Kevin YL Tan and Theo Li-Ann (1997) argued that the 
commitment to equality is an aspect of the rule of law in its assertion that no one should be 
above the law and that the law should be ‘blind’ in treating all parties equally. However, they 
pointed out that equal treatment under the like does not imply that all people should be treated 
alike. With due respect to Harding’s view, the authors would like to reiterate that no legal rule 
can be absolute and unbending. In a living legal system, many departures have to be permitted 
to cater to the exigencies of a complex social and political life. 
 
Critics of affirmative action programs argue that they promote reverse discrimination, as 
opportunities provided for people are not based solely on qualifications but rather their 
belonging to a particular race or group. According to World Bank study in 2011, about 1 
million Malaysians had left the country because Malaysia’s Chinese and Indian citizens chafe 
at being second-class citizens, and many were highly educated. Some 60% of skilled 
emigrants cited ‘social injustice’ as an important reason for leaving Malaysia (The Economist, 
27 April 2013).  
 
Critics also point out that while the National Economic Plan (NEP) managed to lift a 
significant portion of our population out of the poverty trap and create a sizable and urbane 
Malay middle class, it has over the years also been used and abused not only to enrich a small 
elite class of Malay capitalists, but also as a tool of patronage. On this point, some says that a 
reorientation of the policy may be workable to ensure positive discrimination are not being 
abused in favour of certain race, instead in favour of those who truly require support and 
assistance. Most importantly, any kind of affirmative action must be implemented in a 
transparent and accountable manner (Zairil Khir Johari, 2013). Therefore, in the context of 






this article what is important is to address the issue of whether the operation of affirmative 
action in Malaysia reflects the concept of equality under the Federal Constitution.  
 
Affirmative action programs have been litigated both in the United States and India. However 
in Malaysia, such litigation never had occurred, and the courts have thus never had to 
pronounce on the scope and meaning of Art 153, as well as the concepts of ‘special position’ 
and ‘legitimate interest’. The nearest thing to such litigation is the famous case namely 
Merdeka University [1982] 2 MLJ 243, which concerned principally the question of the 
national language and the education system under Art 152, and did not deal with Article 153. 
On the evidence of that case, it seems that the court has carefully interpreted Art 153 and 
legitimating the special privileges, in a manner consistent with the requirements of Malaysian 
society (Harding, 1996).  Apart from the Merdeka University case, perhaps it is also 
important to make reference to the case of Ghazali v Public Prosecutor [1964] MLJ 156, an 
administrative law case which involved the direction made by the minister that alluded to the 
government policy to help the Malays. To that extent the absence of litigation is unfortunate: 
it perpetuates the notion that special privileges are somehow above or outside the law, which 
is clearly not the case.  
 
Apart from that, affirmative action is also claimed as reducing the element of 
competitiveness. By virtue of Article 153 that provides a scheme of preferential treatment for 
Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak in a number of specified areas, affirmative 
action was condemned as violating the liberty of jobs, education, employment, business, etc. 
To the critics, the government should not interfere with the rights and liberties to run a 
business/education institution. This violation of liberty could lead to unqualified candidates 
being selected. Giving the example of NEP’s affirmative action, Celestine (2009) suggested 
that in order to safeguard Malaysia’s economy, Malaysians have to pragmatically phase out 
certain practices. Hence critics, including a growing number of Malays say the affirmative 
action policy reduces the competitiveness of Southeast Asia’s third largest economy and is 
abused by the elites to benefit themselves.  
 
Huang Thio Su Mien (1964) examined the rationale of this particular provision (i.e. Article 
153) under the Federal Constitution by posing some few questions. In case of the Federation 
of Malaysia, what is the rationale behind the conferment of special privileges on (a) the 
aboriginal peoples and (b) the Malays? What is the justification for creating the Orwellian 
situation that ‘all persons are equal, but some are more equal than others’? In case of the 
former, Harding (1996) stated that the justification for empowering the State to take 
ameliorative measures in their favour is based on the notion of protective discrimination. The 
aborigines are the indigenous people of Malaysia and are extremely backward. It is therefore 
necessary that the government should not be precluded from taking discriminatory measures 
to elevate them from their submerged status and hence the exception to the general 
prohibition against discrimination.  
 
Apart from Art 153, it is also vital to make reference to Art 89 while addressing the concept 
of affirmative action under the Federal Constitution. Art 89 of the Federal Constitution 
provides for Malay reserve land. Such land cannot be de-reserved except by a state law that 
has been approved by special majorities in both the State Assembly and the Federal 
Parliament. 
 






Another concern is the operation of affirmative action, whether should be in a temporary or 
permanent basis. It is generally understood that the basis of affirmative action is only 
temporary. It would thus suffice to note that once the objectives of affirmative action are met, 
there is no reason for the continuation of the policy. In other words, if the whole purpose of 
affirmative action is to correct past inequality, it thus becomes vital for such a policy to come 
to an end the moment the purpose is achieved or the past inequality is remedied. Having such 
kind of understanding, it is irrefutable that the time-span for its operation has been criticized. 
Hill et al (2012) as referred to by Wilson (2013) remarked that this over 40 years of practice, 
Malaysia’s affirmative action programme is currently the longest-running in the world. 
Hence, it is important to note that the Reid Commission undoubtedly accepted the affirmative 
action provision as it was in 1957. However, the Commission also recommended that the 
provisions should be reviewed by Parliament every fifteen years, implying that they were a 
constitutional anomaly, which might not need any security in the future. But instead, Article 
159(5) perpetuates these special privileges by giving the Conference of Rulers the power to 
veto any attempt to abolish them. Therefore a solid stand on this matter is necessary having 
regards to the social and political backgrounds of the country. Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi 
(now Tun) once said: “When the objectives are met there is no reason for the continuation of 
the policy because it’s anchored on the objectives and the faster we get to the objective, the 
faster we’ll be able to throw away the crutch”. A survey in 2008 found that 71% of 
Malaysians agreed that ‘race-based affirmative action’ was ‘obsolete’ and should be replaced 
with a ‘merit-based policy’ (The Economist, 27 April 2013). Hence, could this affirmative 
action be phased out upon certain time and all Malaysians are equally given economic 
opportunities? It is the contention of the writers that, perhaps in the context of this study, a 
better idea and understanding of the concept of equality so as to make it in line with the true 
intended spirit of the Federal Constitution is vital.   
 
Conclusions 
It has to be noted that to some affirmative actions may be seen as a threat to the notion of 
equality before the law, which is one of the fundamental human rights. However, it is also 
important to note that in a world of inherent a great difference between the rich and the poor, 
the educated and the illiterate, the privileged and the powerless, and the grant of formal 
equality does not secure the state of being equal (Faruqi, 2008). According to him, one must 
remember that the declaration of formal, legal equality becomes has no meaning in massive 
economic, social and educational disparities. In order to address these great differences or 
inequalities, affirmative action comes as a form of fairness. But perhaps what is important is 
for the Government or the policy makers to look into the issue of whether affirmative action 
can or should be sustained permanently, since to John Rawls (1971, 1999) the basis of 
preferential treatment is only temporary. The Government faces an intimidating task in 
deciding how to deal with this issue. Hence, it is the contention of the authors that perhaps 
this article will provide a foundation or a starting point of further extensive discussion on the 
concept of equality and the operation of affirmative action under the Federal Constitution. 
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